
Last week, 7 days before the MLB draft, I wrote an all-encompassing Nats Draft Preview. My goal was threefold: provide context on the intricacies of the MLB draft process, discuss what we knew ahead of time about the Nats process, and attempt to link that process to names they could take. After the Nats selected 20 players over the weekend, I have a new effort: compare what I thought would happen with what actually happened. I will sprinkle in quotes of sections of my preview, but I do recommend you read it first if you have not yet. Much of the macro-level discussion and analysis remains relevant and helpful even after the draft is completed.
Testing a Thesis
“Based on the backgrounds of the executives now running the Nationals, I expect Washington to prioritize model-friendly hitters early, before targeting college pitching. If they do plan to cut an over-slot deal in rounds three through five, I’d expect it to be a high school hitter, as opposed to the high school pitchers they targeted there in 2025.”
In my first paragraph, I laid out three expectations: model-friendly hitters early, college pitching in the middle rounds, and a preference for an over-slot high-school hitter in rounds three through five. This prediction was based on an analysis of recent front office moves and the histories of two key decision makers, Justin Horowitz and Desmond McGowan.
Model-Friendly Hitters Early
The Nationals’ first pick, at 11 overall, was Chris Hacopian, who very neatly fits the description of a model-friendly hitter (which is explained in more depth in my preview). His strengths — zone contact rate, swing decisions, performance against velocity, exit velos — are typical of a bat favored by analytics. At the same time, his weaknesses — lateral defensive range, batted-ball profile, straight-line speed — are often less valuable to a model than they are in a pure visual evaluation. The Nats followed up Hacopian with Chase Brunson, picked 42nd overall, another bat with model-friendly traits. This prediction feels like a success, especially considering a number of the potentially flashier and less model-friendly bats mocked to them (Reese, Helfrick, Lebron, Lombard) went in the 15 picks following theirs.
College Pitching
The Nats did target college pitching in the middle rounds. However, it came slightly later and less aggressively than I expected. Between the 6th and 15th rounds, the Nats took seven college pitchers. Over that same period, college pitchers accounted for roughly 52% of the 300 picks teams made. In retrospect, the projection for college arm aggression was colored by what I wanted them to do, not what the data told me they would do.
In the section where I discussed Horowitz, I noted that the Red Sox took 27 players in the first five rounds between 2019 and 2023. Only nine of them were pitchers. Their pitcher preference, 62% between the third and 10th rounds, was more geared toward the middle rounds, and this draft year was no different. The Nats took one pitcher, Cooper Harris, an over-slot high school pitcher, in the first five rounds, which is perfectly in line with their history as a group. While this prediction was correct, I should have relied more strongly on the data and been more specific about when those pitchers would have been taken.
An over-slot High School Bat in the 3rd through 5th
Most of this prediction went swimmingly, with the Nats targeting high school hitter Luke Williams in the third with what is expected to be an over-slot deal. What I did not expect was them following this over-slot deal with a second over-slot deal, this time for high school pitcher Cooper Harris in the fourth round.
It seems this pick was seen more as a pick of opportunity than a deliberate plan, with this interesting quote from Paul Toboni featured in MLB.com’s draft recap by Jessica Camerato.
“I just think as he gets stronger and kind of goes through our training and all that, he's just going to really refine who he is as a pitcher. [We're] really excited about him as well. To be candid, I didn't really think there was a chance coming into today that he would be a pick that we could maybe make in the fourth round. But [we’re] really happy that it turned out that way.”
A high school pitcher was still surprising to me, but I wrote about why a pivot to targeting more high school pitching might be possible. Discussing Horowitz’s foray in Pittsburgh, I wrote, “With 5 picks in the top 50 across 2024 and 2025, the Pirates indeed picked 5 high schoolers, but 3 of them were pitchers. It is unclear if this represented a pivot from Horowitz himself, a situational oddity, or an organizational shift.” I then added, below, in the Desmond McGowan section, that the Mets had taken a HS pitcher over-slot in the fourth round in 2025, establishing further precedent. This was another case where my own evaluation preferences leaked into my prediction. Because I tend to rank high school pitchers lower due to injury risk, I underestimated how willing the Nationals would be to target one.
Talking Names
While I hedged my bets repeatedly, I did name some names, with a particular focus on the two I felt were most likely: Jared Grindlinger and Derek Curiel. Curiel was picked fifth overall, never making it to the Nats, but Hacopian is a similar model-driven college bat. As I alluded to in the preview and on Twitter, I saw the conversation between Grindlinger and a college bat as closer to a referendum on which decision-maker, Justin Horowtiz or Desmond McGowan, was at the wheel. Grindlinger was the prototypical young-for-class high school bat that Horowitz had preferred in Pittsburgh and Boston before that. Curiel and Hacopian are closer to McGowan’s history in New York, where the stability of proven college hitters was valued.
Model-driven vs Model-driven
It is at this point that brevity in language failed me. In my preview, I explained what a model-friendly pick was. In an attempt not to repeat myself, a quick summary of that discussion is that a model-friendly pick is a player who exhibits analytical traits indicative of future projection, rather than more traditional, visually apparent “tools”. But that simplifies the discussion too much for what really happens.
There are, of course, thirty proprietary draft models run and relied on to varying degrees throughout Major League Baseball. Even as Baseball has gotten more homogeneous as copycat hires have spread previous competitive advantages, there are still differences between evaluation processes. One apparent difference in value, even between teams considered to pick with strict model reliance, is whether a team favors college bats with a proven track record of analytical success or young-for-class high school bats with analytical traits and remaining physical projection. This is not a hard-and-fast rule, and model-driven organizations often exist somewhere on this spectrum. While the Boston group clearly favored high school hitters, an amalgamation with McGowan’s recent experience in New York likely makes a more neutral model. My strong suspicion that the Nats would favor a high school bat above all else likely should have been tempered by this realization.
So what happened with Grindlinger?
This is a good question, and we can’t answer it without more information. Grindlinger fit their prototype and was still on the board at 11, taken one pick later by the Angels at 12. My cleanest explanation, and the one I think is most likely, is that bonus negotiations continued with Grindlinger, Hacopian, and other candidates up to the day of the draft. Part of what drives a player’s bonus negotiations is which teams they think are likely to take them. If Grindlinger had indications his next likely window was the 16th overall pick to the Rangers, as was initially rumored, the Nats’ bonus offer could be lower, as the difference in slot bonus amounts between 11 and 16 is more than a million dollars. Instead, it seems the Angels were in on him, driving up his price. In fact, the three picks following the Nats were all high school hitters, showing a group of teams who might’ve been interested in Grindlinger, likely further driving up his price. While the Nats likely preferred Hacopian straight up to Grindlinger, this bonus inflation likely made Grindlinger a less desirable candidate to cut under-slot.
How’s my Driving?
I’ve spent a lot of time reading and learning about baseball development and evaluation. One of my favorite recurring pieces I used to cut my teeth on is this series written by Eric Logenhagen, the Lead Prospect Analyst at Fangraphs. Self-reflection offers an opportunity to identify where you went astray and, ideally, improve your process for next time. With that in mind, I wanted to revisit my preview to understand where my reasoning held up, where it didn’t, and what I can learn before next year’s draft.
I feel good about my approach to predicting the draft. Looking back, I didn’t misunderstand the organization’s philosophy, but I slightly misjudged which influences would carry the most weight on draft day. Back in April, when I made my first foray into discussing the draft, I focused on McGowan and his importance to it (where I also pointed to Brunson as a potential target). However, as the draft came closer, I began to transition to a focus on Horowitz as the central figure in the room. It is clear now that McGowan was given significant responsibility. If I had delayed publishing the preview, this fantastic piece by Jesse Dougherty at NOTUS might have pushed me closer back toward a belief in McGowan.
I think the Nationals are best understood as a college-favored, model-driven team. They continued the trend of targeting a very athletic, high-upside high school bat with an over-slot deal. They took several pitchers — Cooper Allen (6th), Gage Peterson (7th), Weston Moss (11th), Matthew Dallas (12th) — who would have an outsized benefit from an increase in fastball velocity. They also took two hitters late — Cashel Duggar (9th), Nick Williams (10th) — with good swing decisions and bat control who would benefit from deliberate bat speed training.
In a pre-publication draft preview, I included a section explaining my personal philosophy regarding the draft. I cut it in the preview, but it now feels relevant to dig back into my drafts to include it here.
I tend to believe in taking bats up the middle with good-hit tools early and lower-velocity college pitchers later. There are a couple of traits organizations tend to be best able to deliberately develop: bat speed, fastball velocity, and batted ball profile. Conversely, teams can struggle with developing zone contact rates, defensive viability, spin rates, and pitcher command. Ideally, you can draft the traits where development systems struggle and use your player development system to fill in the gaps. This is challenging and requires reassessing where other teams are leaving value, but it is my guiding principle.
You can also see this reflected in my prospect rankings, where my preference for hitters like Devin Fitz-Gerald, Christian Franklin, and Marconi German, and pitchers like Jackson Kent, Yoel Tejeda Jr., and Jose Feliz aligns with a similar philosophy.
I think this philosophy is largely reflected in the Nats’ draft. They targeted safer bats early, drafted upside players in the third through the fifth, then pivoted towards players geared towards modern development. With several publications, including this one by Spencer Nusbaum at The Athletic and Doughery’s linked above, discussing the Nats’ interweaving of development and acquisition, this trend feels natural.
I will discuss the draftees themselves later in a full minor-league system update, but, similar to my preview, I think larger discussions like this are often just as important. Players succeed and fail for reasons no evaluator can fully predict. The process behind selecting them, however, is much more stable. As these changes become more apparent throughout the organization, I become increasingly confident in its direction, even if the results stumble along the way.


Is it possible that their preference for college players is temporal and could change based on the distribution of talent throughout their system? Meaning, since many of their high-end prospects are in A / A+ right now, they prefer college bats. And next year, for example, as that talent moves up, they may prefer high school bats.
Is this something you've seen, or does the philosophy tend to remain static?
I wonder if the fact that Hacopian is a Nats fan since childhood might have made them feel he would be easier to sign and then have some more room for bonuses later on.